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Abstract Abby Lippman’s geneticisation thesis, of the early 1990s, argued and anticipated
that with the rise of genetics, increasing areas of social and health related activities
would come to be understood and deﬁned in genetic terms leading to major
changes in society, medicine and health care. We review the considerable literature
on geneticisation and consider how the concept stands both theoretically and
empirically across scientiﬁc, clinical, popular and lay discourse and practice. Social
science scholarship indicates that relatively little of the original claim of the
geneticisation thesis has been realised, highlighting the development of more
complex and dynamic accounts of disease in scientiﬁc discourse and the
complexity of relationships between bioscientiﬁc, clinical and lay understandings.
This scholarship represents a shift in social science understandings of the processes
of sociotechnical change, which have moved from rather simplistic linear models
to an appreciation of disease categories as multiply understood. Despite these
shifts, we argue that a genetic imaginary persists, which plays a performative role
in driving investments in new gene-based developments. Understanding the
enduring power of this genetic imaginary and its consequences remains a key task
for the social sciences, one which treats ongoing genetic expectations and
predictions in a sceptical yet open way.
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Introduction
Within the sociology of health and illness, the development and implications of contemporary
genetics have been a major focus for both debate and research for the past 25 years (Conrad
and Gabe 1999, Tutton and Hallowell 2009), and continue to be an important area of study.
This had led to the creation of new research programmes, journals, conferences, and institutes
and has also stimulated the development of a series of important concepts and theoretical
frameworks. One of the most inﬂuential of these has been Abby Lippman’s geneticisation the-
sis. Put simply, Lippman anticipated that, with the rise of genetics, increasing areas of social
life and health-related activities would come to be understood and deﬁned in genetic terms,
leading to major changes in society, medicine and health care.Yet to date, the contribution of
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genomics to transforming routine healthcare is relatively modest, especially when viewed
against past expectations. What then are we to make of this situation and to what extent has
society been geneticised?
In this review article we provide an overview of this important ﬁeld and take stock of the
now considerable literature on geneticisation. In particular, we consider where the concept now
stands both empirically and theoretically, and reﬂect on the future of this topic. To achieve this,
we present and analyse an in-depth review of the literature published since the early 1990s
under a series of headings related to the main areas covered by the geneticisation thesis: scien-
tiﬁc discourse and practice; clinical discourse and practice; popular culture and lay discourses
and practices. We argue that relatively little of what Lippman anticipated has come to pass, and
suggest that the past twenty ﬁve years have seen both shifts in scientiﬁc understandings of dis-
ease and in social scientiﬁc understandings of the processes of sociotechnical change, both of
which have come to be characterised in more complex ways. We conclude that while the speci-
ﬁc expectations embedded in the geneticisation thesis have not been realised, a powerful genetic
imaginary persists. There is a place for continued scholarship on the origins and consequences
of this genetic imaginary which remains open yet sceptical about the futures imagined.
Lippman’s concept of geneticisation
Abby Lippman ﬁrst introduced the concept of geneticisation in two key papers (Lippman
1991, 1992). In several subsequent papers, Lippman reiterated and further developed her argu-
ments about geneticisation (see for example Lippman 1993, 1998). Together, this body of
work provided a wide-ranging critique of the role of genetics in health care and made a com-
prehensive set of claims about genetics and its uses. She deﬁned geneticisation as:
An ongoing process by which differences between individuals are reduced to their DNA
codes, with most disorders, behaviours and psychological variations deﬁned, at least in part, as
genetic in origin. It refers as well to the process by which interventions employing genetic
technologies are adopted to manage problems of health. Through this process, human biology
is incorrectly equated with human genetics, implying that the latter acts alone to make us each
the organism she or he is. (Lippman 1991: 19)
The central tenets of Lippman’s thesis can be summarised as follows:
1 Genetics is becoming the dominant discourse – both professional and popular (mass media)
discourses about health and disease are increasingly drawing on genetics. Indeed, this is
becoming the dominant discourse about health and disease (Lippman 1991: 15).
2 Genetic discourses are reductionist and deterministic – they suggest that models of health
and disease can be reduced to a set of (biological) components and that, in the end, genes
determine health.
3 Society is becoming stratiﬁed along genetic lines – geneticisation redeﬁnes what are to be
understood as signiﬁcant differences between people, establishing hierarchies among people
on the basis of differences in their DNA.
4 Geneticisation affects our healthcare practices and our values and attitudes – it conditions
how health problems are deﬁned, viewed and managed. It privatises and individualises
health risks and responsibility and focuses attention on biological rather than social condi-
tions, potentially increasing social inequalities and leading to victim blaming. It further
leads to the increased use of genetic technologies in health care, displacing other ways of
categorising and managing illness.
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5 Genetic discourses suggest that genetic research is imperative for future health improvements
– these discourses suggest that ‘increased understanding of disease and improvement in health
will – and can only – be produced by mapping and studying genes’ (Lippman 1992: 1470).
6 Geneticisation reﬂects the power of geneticists to identify and classify health problems – it
reﬂects the cultural assumptions of ‘clinical and research geneticists and their colleagues
[who] are conditioning how we view, name and propose to manage a whole host of disor-
ders and disabilities’ (Lippman 1991: 18).
Lippman’s critique combined a constructionist understanding of health and illness and a com-
mitment to health activism. Her aim was both to highlight the social and cultural assumptions
that underpin genetic ways of categorising and responding to health problems, and to prioritise
alternative responses that foreground the social and structural determinants of health. In this
way, the geneticisation thesis was part of a much wider debate about the construction and
management of health and illness. In particular, Lippman’s reference to the individualising and
privatising of health risks and responsibilities echoes critiques of the wider ﬁeld of health pre-
vention (Petersen and Lupton 1996), suggesting that her arguments have broader relevance
beyond the speciﬁcities of genetics and genomics.
At the same time, Lippman’s original papers were partly intended to counteract the hyper-
bole surrounding the Human Genome Project (HGP) and in particular, her work contributed to
a wider critique or unease about the growing prominence of genetic discourses and practices
around this time. Subsequent theorising about bio/medicalisation (Clarke et al. 2010, Conrad,
2005) has continued to posit a dominant role for genetics/genomics, whilst rehearsing updated
technoscientiﬁc visions of genomic enhancement and redesign.
Methodology and scope of the review
In the years since the geneticisation thesis was ﬁrst elaborated it has become an important con-
cept and reference point in the burgeoning of social science work on the so-called new genet-
ics and subsequently genomics. In addition, the concept has also travelled, been adopted and
reinterpreted in the context of other disciplinary traditions, most notably philosophy. A key
task of this review is therefore to map the development of the geneticisation concept and
examine its multiple meanings.
As a starting point to identifying a corpus of relevant literature that was essentially con-
cerned with the geneticisation concept we undertook an in depth search in ISI Web of Science,
ASSIA and SCOPUS databases using the terms “geneticis/zation” in headings, abstracts and
keyword ﬁelds. We also searched for references citing Lippman 1991 or 1992. The authors
then went through all the results to identify references that employed the concept of geneticisa-
tion and to consider, in particular, those in which this provided a central analytic theme. Inclu-
sion was derived through concensus following a collective process of reading and discussion.
We supplemented these results with additional references, particularly books, drawing on both
Google Scholar and our own knowledge in this ﬁeld. Papers and books which only noted
geneticisation in passing or had a primary focus elsewhere were excluded.
It should be noted that there is a wider body of social science literature about genetics/
genomics that does not enrol the concept of geneticisation or cite Lippman’s papers, and
instead uses alternative concepts, such as biomedicalisation or molecularisation. For purely
practical reasons of scale and scope, we have not included these studies and have in general
used the inclusion criteria outlined above. However, in a small number of cases where such
papers are highly pertinent to the arguments they have been referenced.
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So to be clear about the scope and limits of this review, we do not set out to undertake a
comprehensive sociology of the new genetics, and our review excludes much interesting schol-
arship and further concepts in this ﬁeld. Instead, its focus is on a circumscribed body of work
that elaborates, analyses, and critique’s Lippman’s geneticisation thesis.
The debate about geneticisation after Lippman
The geneticisation thesis has sparked a long-running and at times heated debate about its valid-
ity and interpretation both within the social sciences and between social scientists and other
disciplines, most notably philosophers working in the ﬁeld of bioethics. Geneticisation, as
Lippman (1991) acknowledges, can be seen as being based on the idea of medicalisation, and
discussions of geneticisation have followed a similar trajectory along two main lines. The ﬁrst
has contested the analytical and empirical basis of the concept and the second has broadened
the range of actors implicated in the phenomenon of geneticisation. These debates set out an
empirical agenda for the social sciences and help to circumscribe some key considerations,
which have been taken up to differing degrees in the scholarship we consider in the rest of this
paper.
The analytical and empirical basis
A neutral and descriptive approach One of the scholars most active in this debate has been
Adam Hedgecoe. His critique of geneticisation (Hedgecoe, 1998, 1999) represents a call for
empirical research rather than philosophically based bioethical analysis. He criticises the use of
geneticisation in bioethical analyses, which, he argues, treat geneticisation as an inherently crit-
ical concept, where the implementation of genetic technologies can only be seen as negative.
Hedgecoe (1998: 235; 1999) argues that, in parallel with earlier discussions of medicalisation,
the inherently negative framing of geneticisation prevents ‘a balanced discussion of the pros
and cons and an accurate picture of how the process of geneticisation takes place’ and calls
for a more neutral approach and thorough empirical evidence.
Limited empirical evidence Having set out this agenda, Hedgecoe’s own work looks at devel-
opments in the deﬁnitions and management of a number of conditions (schizophrenia, diabetes,
cystic ﬁbrosis, etc.), mainly through the analysis of published biomedical review papers. We
note, however, Kerr’s (2004) thoroughgoing critique of Hedgecoe’s methods and analytical
focus on geneticisation, which she argues erroneously foregrounds genetic reductionism at the
expense of ambiguity and uncertainty.
Going beyond empirical description Hoedemaekers (2001) and ten Have (2000) have also
taken issue with Hedgecoe. In contrast to the emphasis on geneticisation as an empirical phe-
nomenon, they regard geneticisation, like medicalisation, as a heuristic tool that helps bring
different moral perspectives into view. It can be considered as a ‘philosophical interpretation
of the self-understanding of today’s human life and culture’ (ten Have 2000: 298), which is
not necessarily demonstrable through empirical research. Reﬂecting Lippman’s own arguments,
they suggest that the concept helps draws attention away from the dominant ethical debate at
the level of individual decision-making to the wider socio-ethical issues.
Range of actors implicated
The importance of lay agency Novas and Rose (Novas and Rose 2000, 2004, Rose 2001)
argue that geneticisation ultimately implies the subjection and control of (passive) individuals
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and groups. They disagree, suggesting that patients at genetic risk ‘are increasingly demanding
control over the practices linked to their own health, seeking multiple forms of expert and
non-expert advice in devising their life strategies’ (Novas and Rose 2000: 489). Further, they
argue that genetic information is both individualising, through the responsibility to manage
oneself in the light of genetic risk information, but also collectivising, locating individuals in a
network of relations ‘involving actual and potential kin, employers, partners and children’
(Rose 2001: 19). Furthermore, through increasing ‘biosociality’ (Rabinow 1992), people are
joining into groups based on shared at-risk or biological identities and these groups are
actively shaping biomedical research and practices. Clarke et al. (2010: 80) also refer to the
emergence of ‘new genres of risk-based, genomics-based [. . .] and other technoscience-based
identities’.
Industry as drivers of geneticisation Conrad’s (2005) appraisal of the ‘shifting engines’ of
medicalisation foresees the introduction of a wide range of genetic tests, treatments and
enhancements. While these expectations align with those of geneticisation, Conrad argues that
these will be driven by the interests of biotechnology companies rather than clinicians, thereby
introducing a further set of actors with a stake in geneticisation.
Boundary work Weiner and Martin (2008) have suggested that the notion of geneticisation
may partly be seen as a form of boundary work (Gieryn 1983) undertaken by social scientists
as a means to reinforce their own authority, expertise and resource claims in the area of health
and illness. This view recognises that there may be a number of different professional groups
with a stake in any particular ﬁeld of medicine and sees boundary work as part of normal
disciplinary practices.
Analysing different dimensions of geneticisation
Given the breadth of the notion of geneticisation we organise our analysis around three overar-
ching areas which have formed both the main topics of research and represent key areas of
social life that might be transformed by new genetic knowledge:
• scientiﬁc discourse and practice;
• clinical discourse and practice; and
• popular culture and lay discourses and practices.
In adopting this approach we are not making a distinction between conceptual and empirical
work, but focus instead on how the concept of geneticisation has been constructed in these dif-
ferent ﬁelds.
Geneticisation in scientiﬁc discourse and practice
Work in this category can be divided into three types: ﬁrst, there are articles of a philosophical
nature that focus on demonstrating that genetic models of disease are erroneous, and suggest
that ethical and social analysts have reinforced these mistakes. Second, there are a number of
papers with an empirical focus which explore the rhetorical and practical work of scientists
when attributing genetic causes to diseases or characteristics. Finally, there are papers looking
at the development of the genetic/genomic paradigm and shifts in expectations over time.
In the ﬁrst group, the philosopher Gannett (1999) proposes that there are no wholly objec-
tive criteria for attributing cause and that the designation of a disease or susceptibility as
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genetic always involves a pragmatic element. Echoing Lippman’s constructivist view, she sug-
gests that geneticisation is not the result of increased theoretical knowledge. Rather, genes are
perceived as ‘easier to manipulate, and thus more convenient “handles”, than environmental
factors’ (Gannett 1999: 351) and this view stems from and corresponds with current scientiﬁc,
clinical, economic and political modes of thought. Chaufan (2007) suggests that scholars
engaged with geneticisation have focused on the degree of emphasis on genetic variation and
the beneﬁts and disbeneﬁts of such information, but have largely failed to question the feasi-
bility of identifying such variation in the ﬁrst place, a view she undermines drawing on
methodological arguments. Again echoing Lippman, Chaufan posits that the quest to illuminate
differential vulnerability to common diseases may be at best redundant and at worst harmful in
diverting resources from factors known to produce health irrespective of genome. She con-
cludes that the failure to challenge the genetic paradigm ‘on its own terms matters because it
leaves beliefs about its “potential” (or its imagined dangers) alive’ (Chaufan 2007: 1739).
A second group of scholars look at how such genetic models concerning a range of condi-
tions are accomplished in practice. Hedgecoe (2001, 2002, 2003) provides empirical studies
based on textual analyses of biomedical review papers to suggest different processes of geneti-
cisation: schizophrenia is characterised by a discourse of ‘enlightened geneticisation’ whereby
genetic explanations are prioritised, while environmental factors, although acknowledged, are
underspeciﬁed and undermined; diabetes was subject to a process of ‘geneticisation by stealth’
in which the move from clinical to aetiological classiﬁcation involved the early involvement of
genetic explanations that only became apparent at a later stage; and the introduction of a
genetic test for cystic ﬁbrosis (CF) resulted in a possible extension of the category of CF, but
also resulted in tensions between clinicians’ diagnostic practices and researchers’ deﬁnitions
and uncertainties in the classiﬁcation of the condition.
Subsequent studies based on ethnographies and textual analyses have found parallels with
Hedgecoe’s work, while tending to stress complexity. For example Hall (2005), and Weiner
and Martin (2008) also ﬁnd discourses of enlightened geneticisation, yet Hall (2005) reports in
the case of hypertension the strategic enrolment by geneticists of essentialism and uncertainty
at different points in the funding cycle. Arribas-Ayllon et al. (2010) also ﬁnd coexisting narra-
tives of complexity and reductionism in psychiatric genetics, allowing the ﬁeld to present itself
as cautious, ﬂexible and responsible, and allowing past failures to be reconciled with future
promises. They argue that the narrative of complexity contributes to the everyday work of
managing uncertainty.
Weiner and Martin (2008: 380) focus on the heterogeneity of models of coronary heart dis-
ease in the biomedical literature, arguing that geneticisation is ‘at odds with the diffuse and
distributed nature of biomedical knowledge and practice’. Building on these ideas in the area
of asthma, Bitsch and Stemmerding (2013: 1165) suggest that not only do different aetiologi-
cal discourses about asthma co-exist, they also co-evolve over time, and argue that genomics
has not resulted in geneticisation, but ‘has become part of an “omics” based, complex, multi-
level approach to asthma’. Navon and Eyal’s (2014) work on genomics research into autism
again ﬁnds complexity rather than reductionism. Here genetic mutations act as boundary
objects that can accommodate different understandings of aetiology while facilitating coopera-
tion and exchange. These studies, then, demonstrate the rhetorical role of complexity in the
work of geneticists, as well as the continued complexity and heterogeneity of disease models
across different ﬁelds of biomedical science.
One area of discussion about geneticisation unanticipated by Lippman concerns race. There
has been a major debate about the extent to which notions of race are being reconstructed or
reinscribed along genetic lines in scientiﬁc discourse through the increasing use of DNA tech-
nologies (Duster 2015, Skinner 2006). Although the human genome project was meant to
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herald the end to any biological notions of race, geneticists and biologists have actually
become greatly interested in race and racial differences, especially in the US (Kahn 2012, Pol-
lock 2012). Studies of understandings of race in biomedical research (Epstein 2007, Smart
et al. 2006) conclude that, while considerable effort has been made to establish a geneticised
understanding of race, there is great confusion and uncertainty over the biological meaning of
the categories, with no standardisation or stabilisation. Socio-political constructions of race and
ethnicity remain dominant.
Finally, we consider work that more broadly explores shifting narratives and expectations
within the ﬁeld of genetics. Here we draw on both social science scholarship and scientiﬁc
commentary, that, while not referencing geneticisation, proves illuminating. The dominant
paradigm within genetics historically attributed inherited factors a major role in the aetiology
of common complex conditions. Yet, despite high expectations and heavy investments in new
genomic techniques, studies have highlighted a lack of success in identifying heritable diag-
nostic markers for common diseases and limited translation into treatments and diagnostics in
routine clinical use (Martin and Morrison 2006, Martin et al. 2006; Manolio, 2010). In con-
trast, major successes are deemed to have come from the identiﬁcation of somatic (i.e. non-
inherited) mutations in cancers and the development of targeted treatments.
This ‘lack of progress’ has prompted considerable debate within the biomedical literature
(Manolio et al. 2009, Eichler et al. 2010), with some suggesting that the underlying model of
genetic causation is ﬂawed and overstates the role genes play (Zuk et al. 2012). At the same
time, investment in new techniques continue, leading to new iterations of expectations. It is
claimed, for example, that whole genome sequencing could ‘lead rapidly to clinically signiﬁ-
cant ﬁndings’ (Need and Goldstein 2009: 491). Within genomics, then, we see shifting and
divergent discourses, a down-grading of expectations in some quarters, but continued intellec-
tual and economic investments in others.
Drawing across the micro studies and wider surveys we have reviewed, we see a changing
focus of scientiﬁc interest and social science attention to more complex and dynamic accounts
of disease than anticipated by the geneticisation thesis. We also see developments unantici-
pated by Lippman, including debates about the geneticisation of race, and the therapeutic use
of genomic techniques in conditions unrelated to inherited traits. The rise of this genomic para-
digm over the last 15 years, with its emphasis on complexity and interaction, has therefore
come to eclipse the sometimes crude genetic determinism that underpinned Lippman’s original
thesis. Important changes in scientiﬁc concepts, discourses and practices are therefore reﬂected
in the social science literature. However, despite the move to more complex models of the role
of genetic factors in disease aetiology, the underlying expectations about the power of genetics
and genomics to transform biomedicine remains intact in some quarters, despite critical reﬂec-
tion to the contrary.
The geneticisation of clinical practice
Doubts about the impact of genetics in the clinic are reinforced in detailed studies in clini-
cal settings. As noted above in relation to CF, there may be dissonance between, scientiﬁc
and clinical ways of categorising the condition, and genetic testing has not proven decisive
for diagnosis in clinical practice (Hedgecoe, 2003, Kerr, 2000). Ethnographic work in the
genetics clinic, focusing on dysmorphology (Featherstone et al. 2005, Latimer 2013, Shaw
2003), reinforces this observation that even for ostensibly classically understood genetic con-
ditions, genetic testing is not prioritised over other forms of clinical knowledge: ‘there is no
single hierarchy of knowledge-types’ (Featherstone et al., 2005: 571). Latimer (2013: 24)
ﬁnds that clinicians move between using highly reductive portraits to stand in for the syn-
drome or the genotype such that ‘geneticisation of the body at these moments risks not
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deconstructing but destroying the human’, and adopting more holistic approaches, where the
children are seen as more than the sum of their parts. Rabeharisoa and Bourret (2009: 697)
highlight collaboration rather than tensions between the clinical and research domains, but
again attest to the difﬁculties in adjudicating between phenotypic information and genetic
information, arguing that far from being reductionist, ‘genetics reinforces the complexity of
pathological categories’.
Similar conclusions have been drawn in the area of common conditions. Cox and Star-
zomski’s (2004: 161) study of polycystic kidney disease (PKD) found that ‘recent advances
in genetic knowledge and techniques [have] had a minimal impact on the clinical manage-
ment and social construction of PKD’. They propose a number of factors that might ‘miti-
gate geneticisation’ (Starzomski 2004: 161), including the clinical emphasis on preventing
and treating renal disease, the management of the condition along with all other kidney dis-
ease, the orientation of nephrology health care providers and their reluctance to engage with
the hereditary aspects of PKD, the variable expression of PKD, and the availability of non-
genetic diagnostic techniques. In the area of heart disease, Will et al. (2010: 916) similarly
ﬁnd that clinicians distinguish little between those with inherited and other forms of high
cholesterol, and that ‘DNA testing appeared distant from both the production of a diagnosis
and from management decisions’. In a further example, Hall (2004) found that health care
professionals at a coronary care unit reported that they were reluctant to mention genetics in
patient consultations and that they were likely to foreground lifestyle issues for fear of
inducing fatalism.
In marked contrast, Hoedemaekers and ten Have’s (1998) study of the medical literature
concerning carrier and prenatal screening programmes for b-thalasaemia proposes the enthusi-
astic uptake and advocacy of genetic technologies by health professionals and is critical of the
considerable implicit pressure exerted by medical and public discourses on parents to opt for
selective abortion. This hints at a possible distinction between the diagnosis and management
of existing conditions and prenatal screening practices. A further study that considers prenatal
programmes adopts a co-productionist perspective, explicitly drawing attention to the regula-
tory, cultural and economic aspects of the uptake of technologies). Pavone and Arias (2013),
consider the high levels of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis in Spain and ﬁnd that this is
mediated by local and national factors including the strength of IVF clinics, the technical focus
of the national regulatory body and the inﬂuence of embryologists and stem cell researchers in
it, and the link made between private IVF treatment and tourism. Reinforcing a point we have
made in an earlier section, they argue that geneticisation does not take into account disci-
plinary differences (here between embryologists and gynaecologists) and conclude that ‘geneti-
cisation dynamics might be strongly mediated by local, institutional, social, and cultural
factors’ (Pavone and Arias 2013; 237). This work is important in providing detailed empirical
investigation that links clinical practices and their regulation with diciplinary differences as
well as local cultural and economic inﬂuences.
Contrary to the expectations of the geneticisation thesis, these studies highlight the com-
plex relationship between bioscientiﬁc and clinical understandings of disease, the relatively
circumscribed inﬂuence of geneticists, the diversity of clinical practices, as well as the
wider inﬂuences on such practices. As Hedgecoe (2009: 2) argues ‘the geneticisation thesis
tends to assume that clinicians are passive recipients of new genetic technologies, simply
adopting them as and when they are available’. Hedgecoe’s own work and the studies dis-
cussed here suggest this view is largely unfounded and underscore the limitations of the
widely held assumption that genetics and genomics will transform medicine. These studies
demonstrate that medical practice is much more than just the application of scientiﬁc
knowledge.
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Geneticisation, popular culture and lay discourses and practices
In examining the potential cultural impact of the new genetics some have focused on the nat-
ure and power of the metaphors used in their explanation (e.g. Fox-Keller 1998, Nelkin 1994,
Nijhout 1990). The great promise of genetics and genomics was boosted, it was claimed, by
the use of a set of core essentialist metaphors, especially that of ‘the book of life’ which car-
ries ‘instructions’ for the making of organisms (Hellsten 2002). This was the prominent meta-
phor, together with ‘maps’ and ‘blueprints’ (Lippman 1992), used in scientiﬁc and popular
accounts of the Human Genome Project.
In terms of popular cinema, Franklin (2000) and Stacey (2010) both offer different versions
of what they call the ‘genetic imaginary’. Franklin writes about the 1993 Hollywood ﬁlm
Jurassic Park which shows the power of genetic science to recreate life through the new prac-
tices of the genomic biosciences, as further demonstrated by the media attention given to the
cloning of Dolly the Sheep. Stacey considers ﬁlms such as Gattaca (1997), Alien: Resurrec-
tion (1997) and Code 46 (2004) that focus on genomics and cloning. She notes that her ‘start-
ing point for thinking about the cinematic life of the gene is to interrogate [. . .] a set of very
tangible anxieties surrounding the reconﬁguration of the boundaries of the human body, the
transferability of its informational components, and the imitative potentialities of geneticised
modes of embodiment (Stacey 2010: 8).
In addition to these analyses of cinematic representations, much of the analysis of popular
culture has used the press coverage of genetics and biotechnology as both indicators of and
inﬂuences on public perceptions. Based on the UK press, Bauer (2007, 2009) has described
‘the public career of the gene’ and trends in public sentiment from 1946 to 2002. The most
striking historical change is the exponential rise in the number of stories about genetics which
takes off in the mid 1980s and peaks in 1999. However, in a review of US magazine articles
about genetics, Condit et al. (1998) found the discourse of the 1990s was signiﬁcantly less
deterministic than discussions from the 1960s and 1970s.
While essentialist metaphors may have prevailed in scientiﬁc communication, their reception
seems to be mediated by the cultural frames of their audiences (Condit 1999, 2004). Evidence
suggests that everyday public understandings do not see genes as primary or sole determinants.
People consider that the salience of genetics varies for different conditions and that genetic
factors do not rule out the role of other, environmental, factors (Bates et al. 2003, Parrott et al.
2003). Evidence from the UK suggests that perceptions related to the causation of traits and
diseases have not changed signiﬁcantly over the period 1995 to 2010 (Richards and Black
2017). Research in the US, however, suggests, at least for some stigmatised conditions, such
as obesity, mental illnesses, and addictions, belief in the importance of genes as causal agents
might have increased with the development of the new genetics (e.g. Phelan and Link, 2012,
Singer et al. 1998). Freese and Shostak (2009: 117) concluded from their review of work on
public perceptions of genetic causation that we do not know whether there has been ‘any over-
all shift toward a belief in genetics, as obviously widespread notions of the importance of
breeding and inborn characteristics long predate the discovery of DNA’. This might suggest
that the ‘new genetics’ and its reporting in the media have had little effect on public percep-
tions and that widely held social representations are resistant to the cultural shifts associated
with geneticisation.
This is further supported by studies with people who have genetic susceptibilities for com-
mon diseases which suggest that lay understandings are fairly durable, even in the face of clin-
ical experiences. Weiner (2009), for example, reports that people with familial
hypercholesterolaemia do not necessarily foreground genetic elements in their personal
accounts of heart disease. Even in the case of hereditary cancers, Scott et al. (2005) report that
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genetics does not trump other aspects of disease aetiology in lay understandings. These studies
stress continuities with established lay knowledge rather than transformations.
Nevertheless, in studies of the social and psychological consequences of clinic visits and the
predictive genetic testing that may be offered for breast cancer and other Mendelian diseases,
an explicit discourse of geneticisation has gained some theoretical purchase. An important, but
contested site for such claims has been kinship and family relationships. Finkler (2005: 1060)
asserts that the ‘cultural currency of scientiﬁc discourse concerning beliefs in genetic inheri-
tance in American society inﬂuence[s] people’s lives in almost all areas of existence, including
ethical, legal and social domains’. Finkler argues that kinship has been medicalised (which
others have read as geneticised, e.g. Gibbon 2002) through the family pedigrees which are cre-
ated in cancer genetic clinics. Contrasting the work of Finkler on breast cancer and Rapp
(1999) on prenatal screening, Franklin (2013:301) observes that: ‘for Rapp, existing social def-
initions of kinship can supersede geneticisation, displacing it in favour of stronger, pre-existing
kinship ties’. Rapp’s ﬁndings chime with other studies that look at patients’ responses to
emerging genetic and related technologies (e.g. Featherstone et al. 2006, Mamo 2005). These
suggest that lay understandings and practices do not follow directly from clinical framings,
thereby challenging the attributions of agency implied by the geneticisation thesis. This fore-
grounding of lay agency aligns, in general, with the arguments of Novas and Rose (Novas and
Rose 2000, 2004, Rose 2001). Yet the ﬁndings counter their wider suggestions in that genetic
ties may be less central than they propose, and people may fail to adopt the genetically
informed identities they anticipated (e.g. Lock, 2008, Weiner, 2011).
DNA technologies have also been deployed in spheres outside the clinic, notably in direct-
to-consumer markets, and DNA geneology testing represents one signiﬁcant area. Nash
(2004:1) analyses two examples of popular representations of genetic testing in popular
genealogy, arguing that ‘geneticised genealogy’ draws on discourses of family relatedness to
produce new biosocial groups ‘in the form of Y-chromosome genetic brotherhood, Mitochon-
drial DNA clan membership and global genetic kinship’. Nelson (2008) provides an
ethnography of genetic genealogy testing and attends to the potential geneticisation of race
through a nuanced account of the way African American and black British consumers of
these tests pick their way through genetic information in the context of family histories, and
their endeavours to make the biological biographically meaningful. Nelson (2008: 775)
demonstrates their ‘efforts to reconcile “nature” and “culture” into identity’ and in doing so
lay bare simplistic either/or readings of ‘race’. Prainsack and Hashiloni-Dolev (2009) sound
further caution to any expectations of simple determinism in this area. Drawing on several
examples, particularly attempts to distinguish ‘Jewishness’ through genomics, they suggest a
‘complex relationship between genes, individual/collective identities and politics’ (Prainsack
and Hashiloni-Dolev 2009: 412).
It therefore appears that genetic discourses, DNA tropes and symbols have become part of
our everyday worlds, and popular culture is imprinted with a genetic imaginary. There is
some disagreement about whether genetics has become more dominant in popular representa-
tions and lay understandings and whether these have become more deterministic over time.
Contrary to the fears of geneticisation, studies from clinical settings and of direct-to-consumer
tests suggest that lay understandings are relatively durable and genetic framings are unlikely
to replace wholesale existing identities and social ties. Geneticisation has been critiqued for
neglecting lay agency and these studies demonstrate the way lay people may resist or be
selective about the aspects of genetics they integrate into their lives. These discussions sug-
gest misapprehensions in the core assumptions underpinning the geneticisation thesis regard-
ing the relationship between scientiﬁc knowledge, popular representations and cultural
change.
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Reﬂections on geneticisation
In summary, it is clear from our review that relatively few of the original claims of the geneti-
cisation thesis have been realised: genetic discourses have only (partially) become dominant in
the laboratory; simplistic determinism and reductionism has been replaced by complexity; soci-
ety has not become stratiﬁed along genetic lines in the way imagined by Lippman; gentic
knowledge has only had a limited impact (so far) in the prediction of common disorders; and
geneticists have had relatively little power in redeﬁning health problems. We will argue, how-
ever, that genetic ideas still constitute a powerful social imaginary within both science and the
media, and genetic discourses remain central to future health research agendas.
Understanding the process of sociotechnical change
In retrospect, the original geneticisation thesis rested on what now seems a rather simplistic
and naive linear model of the process of sociotechnical change, in which new scientiﬁc knowl-
edge is readily translated into the clinic, and powerfully shapes the wider social and cultural
world. However, it should be stressed that this view was widely shared at the time in science,
industry, policy and the social sciences.
In the last 20 years a much more complex understanding of the way in which scientiﬁc
knowledge shapes sociotechnical change within biomedicine has emerged, and the research
reviewed here has contributed to this shift in a major way. This review has shown that in most
areas where (biomedical) hopes and (social and ethical) fears failed to materialise this was not
due to ethical problems or effective regulation. Instead, this was the result of a complex mix
of the intransigence of nature, powerful existing narratives about the causes of disease, other
competing forms of knowledge and professional expertise, and the challenge of translation and
commercialisation. In our review we have demonstrated that social scientists have increasingly
elucidated and engaged with the complexities of these sociotechnical entanglements. We have
also ﬂagged theoretical and empirical work that stresses the role and responses of lay actors,
who are all but absent in the original formulation of geneticisation. Thus, disease categories
are multiply understood and neither clinicians nor lay people are passive recipients of genetic
knowledge or technologies.
The persistence and performativity of the genetic imaginary
While the geneticisation thesis, based on a particular model of the role of genes in determining
disease, has been superceded, we suggest that many of the expectations and promises that
genetics and genomics would transform human health and health care remain intact. For exam-
ple, in scientiﬁc discourses and media representations around disease aetiology, and in the for-
mulation of agendas for future research. In this sense, genetics and genomics remain the
central elements in a powerful ‘genetic imaginary’. An imaginary is a collectively embraced
actionable future in which technological change will bring about certain positive, culturally
intelligible results (Jasanoff and Kim 2009). At the heart of this imaginary is the notion that
the causes of many diseases are fundamentally rooted in our biology and the internal working
of genes and DNA. By understanding the molecular basis of disease we can create a new kind
of medicine. As scientiﬁc knowledge has developed these ideas have been couched in more
complex language and based on the use of new tools and technologies, but the foundational
assumptions remain intact. This genetic imaginary has deep historical roots in the birth of
molecular genetics and genetic engineering organised around the ‘molecular vision of life’
(Kay 1993). However, the genetic imaginary is being continually remade and rearticulated.
Previous expectations of the power of genetics have been forgotten, such as the existence of
single genes for common disorders, or re-named, such as in the shift from ‘personalised’ to
‘precision’ medicine. At the same time, new hopes are being constructed around the
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development and application of waves of novel biotechnologies, the most recent of which
include gene editing, the growth in biological drugs, and whole genome sequencing.
Narratives in which future scientiﬁc and technological progress will transform biomedicine
and healthcare have persisted over the last 20 years. So why has the genetic imaginary
remained so powerful and attractive despite the difﬁculties in its practical realisation? We
argue that the major reason for this is its performative function and alignment with powerful
social and economic interests. Lippman’s formulation of the geneticisation thesis was clearly
framed within a critical political economy of health and medicine, yet what is striking from
our review is the near complete absence of social science work in this tradition relating to
geneticisation. In this light, we argue that the genetic imaginary and its framing of health prob-
lems as internal in origins and open to technological interventions, plays an important role in
obscuring the social origins and determinants of illness. As a theory, it has also played a pow-
erful performative role in mobilising resources for genetic and genomic research, legitimising
the emphasis on pharmaceutical solutions (Williams et al. 2011), and framing health problems
in largely individualistic terms. The genetic imaginary can thus be seen as a regime of percep-
tibility (Shostak and Moinester 2015) embedded in a particular political economy which serves
the interests of the state, industry and the professions and where: ‘individual level rather than
social structural understandings of health risks, and clinical rather than population level inter-
ventions – that gave genetics its cultural power – persists today” (2015: 232). In this sense,
our arguments align with Lippmans’s broad framing of the ﬁeld and her overarching project.
Our analysis, however, places into question the speciﬁcs of her analysis and the expectations
they embed. We consider this further in the following subsection.
Social science, reﬂexivity, and the making of genetic futures
Reﬂecting on the ﬁndings of our review, we observe that one of the few areas which was suc-
cessfully geneticised was the work of those social scientists and bioethicists who anticipated
major ethical dilemmas, new forms of biological subjectivity and biosociality, and major trans-
formations in healthcare and the economy associated with genetics and genomics (e.g. biomed-
icalisation). Geneticisation as an expectation of the future has helped to marshal resources and
allies in the social sciences. At the same time, their work can be thought of as helping to rein-
force and echo geneticists own anticipations of the future of their research and its social signif-
icance, and has therefore played an important role in coproducing the genetic imaginary.
Despite our conclusion that the geneticisation thesis, as originally formulated, is redundant,
there remains signiﬁcant social science research to be undertaken in the future given the endur-
ing power and persistence of the genetic imaginary. Critical studies will continue to be needed
of the development, application and consequences of the latest waves of emerging biotechnol-
ogy, such as genome editing and whole genome sequencing. It will also be important to chart
the historical and contemporary transformation in the genetic imaginary, highlighting areas of
continuity and change, as well as opening up alternative discourses that emphasise the social
dimensions of health and illness. Given the gap mentioned above, further work on the political
economy of genetics and genomics is needed that systemically analyses, for example, the
shaping of heath research agendas (the inﬂuence of different stakeholders, beneﬁciaries and
their expectations, the alignment with larger political or strategic interests).
Furthermore, given the relatively large investment, by social science standards, into social
and ethical scholarship in this area, what broad lessons might we learn from this experience
that we could bring to bear in the analysis of other emerging technologies? We would suggest
that as social scientists we need to be wary of claims to novelty, pay attention to history, and
in particular to the history of past promise-making, to place sociotechnical complexities at the
forefront of our analyses, and be wary of making predictions. This is not to argue for a
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‘futureless sociology’, which as Adam (2011) rightly points out, seems largely indefensible in
a world where the effects of technoscience might be felt far beyond the present. In this respect,
Fortun (2008: 288) calls for social scientists to adopt both a sceptical, but also an open posi-
tion in relation to emerging technologies, where expectations are treated with due diligence,
arguing: ‘What’s needed is an analytic adroitness, a tolerance for contradictions and paradoxes
[. . .] and sustained critical involvement’. This, surely, is one vital lesson we can learn from
the work we have reviewed here and which strikes us as highly relevant to social scientiﬁc
investigation of other ﬁelds.
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